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11 декабря прошлого года я прочитал лекцию в Питере с критическим разбором либертарианской этики и политической философии в том их варианте, который исходит из концепции естественного права. Недавно встретил в одной статье краткое - в одном абзаце - изложение значительной части моих аргументов. Кое-кто из присутствовавших тогда читают мой ЖЖ; другим может быть просто интересна эта этическая аргументация, с которой я полностью согласен.
Man is a moral being, and he cannot live as man, nor can he function in society, unless he considers some things right and other things wrong. [Secular] thought, in trying to tell us how we may distinguish right from wrong, presupposes that the origin of morality must lie in man or in the universe itself. It cannot lie in the universe, since the universe or the world is not a moral agent and thereby not ethically revelatory. Theories of ethical naturalism have always foundered on this elementary fact. If it lies in man, it must rest either in mankind as a whole or in an individual. It cannot rest in mankind, since if it did, there should never be disagreement over right and wrong. Nor can it rest in the majority, since this would counter the agreed-upon fact that majorities are capable of being wrong. If it rests in man at all it must rest with the individual to determine right and wrong. But why listen to another finite individual? Why even listen to him when he claims to give us a standard for moral decision-making, such as the categorical imperative or the utilitarian greatest-happiness principle? Not only are these human constructions unable to give us such a standard (since they can be consistently applied in a way which circumvents morality and leads to the grossest immorality), but there is no reason whatsoever to listen to someone
who proposes one of them as a moral standard. For example, suppose a utilitarian should commend to me his greatest-happiness principle. I may ask him, “Why ought I to accept this standard?” Either he must appeal to something beyond this standard to justify it, in which case he shows that it cannot be the standard of moral justification, or he must assert that universal acceptance of the utilitarian standard will lead to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, which presupposes the validity of that standard and thus begs the question.
(Douglas K. Erlandson, "Contemporary Continental Philosophy and Modern Culture", Journal of Christian Reconstruction, Vol.10 (1984), No.2)
Man is a moral being, and he cannot live as man, nor can he function in society, unless he considers some things right and other things wrong. [Secular] thought, in trying to tell us how we may distinguish right from wrong, presupposes that the origin of morality must lie in man or in the universe itself. It cannot lie in the universe, since the universe or the world is not a moral agent and thereby not ethically revelatory. Theories of ethical naturalism have always foundered on this elementary fact. If it lies in man, it must rest either in mankind as a whole or in an individual. It cannot rest in mankind, since if it did, there should never be disagreement over right and wrong. Nor can it rest in the majority, since this would counter the agreed-upon fact that majorities are capable of being wrong. If it rests in man at all it must rest with the individual to determine right and wrong. But why listen to another finite individual? Why even listen to him when he claims to give us a standard for moral decision-making, such as the categorical imperative or the utilitarian greatest-happiness principle? Not only are these human constructions unable to give us such a standard (since they can be consistently applied in a way which circumvents morality and leads to the grossest immorality), but there is no reason whatsoever to listen to someone
who proposes one of them as a moral standard. For example, suppose a utilitarian should commend to me his greatest-happiness principle. I may ask him, “Why ought I to accept this standard?” Either he must appeal to something beyond this standard to justify it, in which case he shows that it cannot be the standard of moral justification, or he must assert that universal acceptance of the utilitarian standard will lead to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, which presupposes the validity of that standard and thus begs the question.
(Douglas K. Erlandson, "Contemporary Continental Philosophy and Modern Culture", Journal of Christian Reconstruction, Vol.10 (1984), No.2)
